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Piecemeal policy reformWhat kinds of tariff reform are likely to raise welfare in situations where tariff revenue is important? General
conditions for welfare to rise without reducing tariff revenue are opaque. We show that they can be greatly sim-
pliﬁed using a small number of sufﬁcient statistics, primarily the generalized mean and variance of tariffs. We
present sufﬁcient conditions for a class of linear tariff reform rules that guarantee higher welfare without a loss
in revenue. The rules consist of convex combinations of (i) trade-weighted-average-tariff-preserving cuts in
dispersion; and (ii) uniform tariff cuts that preserve domestic relative prices among tariff-ridden goods.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
What kinds of tariff reform are likely to raise welfare in situations
where tariff revenue is important? The question is an important one:
despite steady reductions in average tariffs, tariff revenue is still a signif-
icant component of total tax revenue, especially in low-income coun-
tries. Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) review the empirical evidence on
the revenue effects of trade liberalization in recent decades, and con-
clude that, while middle-income countries have managed to offset re-
ductions in trade tax revenues by increasing their domestic tax
revenues, many low-income countries have not. Even in rich countries,
the revenue effects of changes in tariffs can be substantial in absolute if
not in relative terms, and can be a factor inﬂuencing the decision to lib-
eralize trade. The implications of trade reform for revenue have featured
prominently in discussions of the EU's association agreements with
countries in the Southern Mediterranean region (see Abed, 1998), ande title “Revenue Tariff Reform.”
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rson),
. This is an open access article undereven in ofﬁcial discussions of the case for the U.S. joining NAFTA
(see Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, 1993).1
Unfortunately, as we shall see, general conditions for welfare to rise
without reducing tariff revenue are opaque, and provide little guidance
to practical policy-making. Our main contribution is to show that they
can be greatly simpliﬁed using a small number of sufﬁcient statistics, pri-
marily the generalized mean and variance of tariffs. Reexpressing the
general conditions in terms of these sufﬁcient statistics leads to new op-
erational guidelines for tariff reform that guarantee higher welfarewith-
out a loss in revenue. The rules consist of convex combinations of cuts in
tariff dispersion that preserve the trade-weighted-average-tariff, on the
one hand, and uniform tariff cuts that preserve domestic relative prices
among tariff-ridden goods, on the other. These guidelines provide a the-
oretical foundation for the standard World Bank advice to developing
country clients that they should reduce dispersion of tariffs while main-
taining average tariffs to preserve revenue. In plausible special cases, the
rules require only observable data and a small number of aggregate
elasticities.
Our approach builds on the sizeable literature on trade policy reform
in open economies, stemming in particular from Hatta (1977). Much of
this literature provides guidelines for welfare-improving tariff reform
when government revenue is not a concern, which amounts to1 We are grateful to Doug Irwin for this reference.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
2 See Anderson and Neary (2007) for a discussion of the trade expenditure function
when labor supply is ﬁxed, and for further references.
3 All vectors are column vectors and a prime denotes a transpose.
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approach has been extended to study the interplay of revenue and efﬁ-
ciency considerations in trade policy reform by a number of authors, in-
cluding Falvey (1994), Emran and Stiglitz (2005), Hatta and Ogawa
(2007), and Raimondos-Møller and Woodland (2015). However, these
papers either use relatively special low-dimensional models, or do not
provide rules that can be easily implementable. An exception is a branch
of the literature which advocates replacing border taxes with domestic
consumption taxation. (See for example, Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994),
Keen and Ligthart (2002), and Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Møller
(2008).) The intuitive argument that the base is broader can be supple-
mented with optimality considerations. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)
demonstrated that it is inefﬁcient to distort productive efﬁciency
when raising revenuewith distortionary taxation. Trade taxes, by subsi-
dizing production, drive a wedge between domestic and international
marginal rates of transformation. However, Anderson (1999) shows
that gradual reform of this type need not improve welfare when uni-
form radial reductions are used to lower tariffs. The present paper ad-
mits a much broader class of trade reforms when wage taxation is the
alternative revenue source and provides more optimistic prospects for
tariff reforms which reduce dispersion.
The present paper draws on Anderson and Neary (2007), where the
approach using generalized moments of the tariff structure was intro-
duced and applied to devising rules for trade policy reform in the con-
ventional setting of no revenue constraint. That paper derived linear
welfare-improving reform rules as implications of reform that reduced
either or both of two sufﬁcient statistics, the generalizedmean and gen-
eralized variance of the tariff structure. Here we extend these methods
to the case where lump-sum taxes and transfers are not feasible and
so the government faces a binding revenue constraint. All government
tax changes become costly at the margin because they involve distor-
tions. The same sufﬁcient statistics prove useful in the case of an active
revenue constraint, supplemented by some additional aggregate elastic-
ity terms. In a big step toward applicability with very limited informa-
tion, Anderson and Neary (2007) also showed that, in a special CES
case, the generalized mean and variance reduced to the readily observ-
able trade-weighted version of these statistics. A second contribution of
the present paper is to demonstrate that observability of generalized
moments obtains with weak separability, nesting not only the CES but
most other widely-used preference and technology structures. A
group of goods such as clothing under separability can contain pairs
that are complements (shirts and trousers) and other pairs that are sub-
stitutes (cotton and silk shirts). The separable setting also permits a fur-
ther realistic extension which replaces the representative agent with
heterogeneous agents while maintaining feasible operational rules
that yield Pareto improvement.
Section 2 sets up the model and derives the general expressions for
tariff reform in the presence of revenue constraints. Though insightful,
these do not easily lend themselves to practical implementation. The re-
mainder of the paper shows how they can be operationalized using the
tariff moments approach introduced in Anderson and Neary (2007).
Section 3 reviews and extends that approach, while Sections 4 and 5
use it to analyze trade reform and to derive the main results of the
paper. Section 6 extends the results to the case of many households,
while Section 7 concludes.
2. Equilibrium and the effects of tariffs and taxes
2.1. The setting
The tariff reform problem is to advise on directions of change of
tariffs from initial values. Full optimization is not feasible by assump-
tion. The setting is a competitive small open economy which raises its
revenue with a set of tariffs and with a wage tax. For simplicity we
will present the results in terms of a perfectly competitive economy
though, as shown in Anderson and Neary (2005), the results alsoapply to a variety of monopolistically competitive models with ﬁxed
entry costs and ﬁrm heterogeneity. The wage tax is distortionary be-
cause labor supply is variable (due to household choice in an economy
where immigration is shut down) and leisure cannot be taxed. Tariffs
and the wage tax are initially set sub-optimally. The objective of the re-
form is to move the taxes gradually toward their optimal (Ramsey)
values. This section ﬁrst describes the economy and then derives gener-
al expressions which show how tariff changes affect welfare and tariff
revenue. These results are the key building blocks for our results in
later sections that are expressed in terms of tariff aggregates.
The representative consumer's net expenditure function is given by
e(π, w, u). It gives the minimum spending needed to sustain a level of
utility or real income uwhen the representative consumer faces a vector
of prices of traded goods subject to tariffs, denoted by π, and a net-of-tax
wage rate denoted byw. The domestic prices π differ fromworld prices
π* by a vector of speciﬁc tariffs t. Since the economy is small, the world
prices are exogenous, so changes in domestic prices dπ are equal to
changes in tariffs dt throughout. Implicit in the list of arguments of e is
the price of a composite export good, which we take as numeraire so
its price can be set equal to one. By Shephard's Lemma, eπ gives the vec-
tor of ﬁnal demand for traded goods, while− ew gives labor supply. As
for the supply side of the economy, the maximum value of GDP which
can be produced given its technology and facing goods prices π and a
gross wage w + τ, where τ is the tax on labor income, is given by the
GDP function g(π, w + τ). By Hotelling's Lemma, the vector of supply
of traded goods (orwhere appropriate,minus the demand for traded in-
puts) is given by gπ while− gw gives labor demand.
The trade expenditure function for this economy is deﬁned as the
excess of domestic expenditure over GDP, with the added constraint
that the labor market clears in the background:2
E π; τ;uð Þ ¼ max
w
e π;w;uð Þ−g π;wþ τð Þ½ : ð1Þ
E gives the net transfer to the private sector needed to support utility
uwhen domestic prices of traded goods are set at π and the wage tax is
set at τ. Its derivative with respect to π, Eπ, is the vector of excess de-
mand for traded goods, which equals the vector of net imports m;
while its derivative with respect to τ, Eτ=− gw, is equilibrium employ-
ment, where themaximization with respect tow ensures that the labor
market clears: ew = gw.
Since e-g is concave in (π, w, τ), E is concave in (π, τ): compensated
net import demand functions are downward-sloping, and a higher
wage tax reduces employment.
The private-sector budget constraint is:
E π; τ;uð Þ−s ¼ 0: ð2Þ
Here, s is the transfer from the government to the private sector. If
the government has lump-sum power, s is an active policy instrument.
Otherwise, it is an exogenous transfer, which also serves as a useful an-
alytic link between the private-sector and government budget
constraints.
The government budget constraint expresses the requirement that a
given amount of revenue must be raised net of subsidies. Taxes are col-
lected on tradable goods at rates t= π− π* and on labor at the rate τ.
The government budget constraint is therefore given by:3
R π; τ;u; sð Þ≡t0Eπ þ τEτ−s≥R0: ð3Þ
Here, R0 represents the government's revenue requirement, to fund
public goods, repay foreign loans, orﬁnance someother goalwhichdoes
not directly affect private-sector decisions. Extending the model to
F
A
O
π2
π1
.
.
.R dTa = 0
Fig. 1. The tariff reform problem. A is the initial point, F is free trade, and R is the Ramsey
optimum.
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of Atkinson and Stern (1974), or, in a trade context, Abe (1992). We do
not pursue this approach here, since it distracts from our primary focus,
using summary statistics to simplify the guidelines for tariff and tax
reform.
To clarify the implications of this setup, contrast it with the standard
setting in the theory of piecemeal trade policy reform, where it is im-
plicitly assumed that any revenue change is actively transferred in a
lump-sum way between the private-sector and government budgets.
Then the transfer s is endogenous, and we can combine the private-
sector budget constraint (2) with the government budget constraint
(3) to form the social budget constraint, which is also the balance of
trade constraint with the rest of the world: net expenditure by the pri-
vate sector must bematched by tax revenue less government spending:
E π; τ;uð Þ ¼ s ¼ t0Eπ þ τEτ−R0: ð4Þ
In this case, the government's revenue requirement is not an inde-
pendent constraint on policy-making because the transfer s adjusts en-
dogenously. This makes a crucial difference for evaluation of tariff
reform: Eq. (4) leads to the standard results of piecemeal trade policy
reform, augmented to allow for an exogenous wage tax. (See
Appendix A for details.)
In the setting considered in the rest of the paper, by contrast, lump-
sum transfers are infeasible, so the gradual reform problem is to deter-
mine welfare-improving directions of change in the set of reformable
tariffs t, equivalent to changes in π, while at the same time not decreas-
ing revenue. One class of reforms takes the wage tax as given and looks
for tariff reforms that raise both welfare and revenue. Amore ambitious
class of tariff reforms permits the wage tax to vary endogenously in
order tomaintain government revenue. We consider each of these clas-
ses in turn.
2.2. The problem
A diagram illustrating the three-good case, two of them subject to
tariffs, aids intuition. In Fig. 1, initial tariffs are such that domestic prices
equal πA, corresponding to point A. Point F represents free trade, but of
course that yields zero revenue. Optimal revenue-raising tariffs imply
Ramsey-optimal prices πR, corresponding to point R. The tariff reform
problem is to devise rules that will improve welfare locally; directions
of change for π starting from A that bring the economy closer to R in
the sense of attaining a higher iso-welfare contour.4 However, the4 Atkinson and Stern (1974) show in a similar setting that, as the permitted level of
lump-sum taxation rises, there exists a path from R to the ﬁrst-best optimum F along
which welfare increases steadily. Here we are interested in characterizing the desired di-
rection from an arbitrary initial point A toward R.shape of the iso-welfare contours depends on the policy instruments
available to the government. The line though point A labeled dTa = 0
shows combinations of domestic prices that keep the trade-weighted
average tariff Ta constant. As we will see below, it is also an iso-
welfare locus for the casewhere thewage tax is given: i.e., it is implicitly
deﬁned by the private-sector budget constraint (2) for given u, τ, and s.
By contrast, the elliptical locus drawn through point A shows combina-
tions of domestic prices that keep welfare constant when the wage tax
adjusts to maintain revenue: it satisﬁes both the private-sector budget
constraint (2) and the government budget constraint (3) for given u (s
is now irrelevant) and with τ adjusting endogenously. This locus is
one of a family of iso-welfare curves centered around R: each raises
the same amount of revenue but yields successively higher levels of
welfare as R is approached. As drawn, the locus encloses a convex set
of π's and is upward-sloping at A, but these properties are not guaran-
teed. To determine more precisely the location of these iso-welfare
contours and hence the desired direction of tax reform away from A,
we need to develop a more formal analysis.
2.3. Tariff changes only
Consider ﬁrst the case where the wage tax is given. Differentiating
the private budget constraint (2) with τ and s ﬁxed shows that real in-
come measured in expenditure units is directly reduced by increases
in tariffs:
Eudu ¼ −E0πdt: ð5Þ
Similarly, differentiating the government budget constraint (3) and
using Eq. (5) to eliminate Eudu yields an expression linking the change
in government revenue to changes in tariffs:
dR ¼ R0πdπ þ Rudu ¼ 1−RIð ÞE0πdt þ t0Eππ þ τEτπð Þdt: ð6Þ
The coefﬁcient of the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side, 1− RI, is the
“Hatta (1977) normality term” or the inverse of the “shadow price of
foreign exchange.” Here, RI denotes the derivative of revenue with re-
spect to nominal income given the tax structure:
RI≡
Ru
Eu
¼ t0 Eπu
Eu
þ τEτu
Eu
: ð7Þ
We will assume that this term lies in the unit interval:
Assumption 1. RI is positive and less then one.
A host of arguments has been given in the literature on piecemeal
policy reform to defend this assumption. Normality sufﬁces, as does
homotheticity or a standard stability condition.5 Violation of the as-
sumption would be perverse indeed, since it would imply that a gift of
foreign exchange to the private sector, enabling a rise in real income,
would at constant prices π either reduce government revenue or raise
it by more than the value of the gift. In the presence of lump-sum redis-
tribution, moreover, a negative value of RI would imply that gifts make
the economy worse off.
Comparing the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of Eq. (6) with
Eq. (5) reveals the tension between private and public spending:
dRþ 1−RIð ÞEudu ¼ t0Eππ þ τEτπð Þdt: ð8Þ
The left-hand side suggests a clear presumption that more for the
government means less for the private sector. However a positive
value for the term on the right-hand side can offset this presumption,5 See, for example, Foster and Sonnenschein (1970), Bruno (1972), and Hatta (1977),
and the discussion in Section 3.1 below. In the homothetic case, RI = Ru/Eu reduces to
Taπ′eπ/e− Tw(w+ τ)gw/e, the average tax rate on goods and employment as a share of
total expenditure.
6 Empirically, requiring (1− μτRI)−1 to be positive ismore demanding than before, giv-
en that μτ is likely to be greater than one. On the other hand, empirical studies typically
ﬁnd relatively low values of the labor supply elasticity, hence low μτ is plausible.
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from reforms that remove inefﬁciency in the tariff structure. Below, we
characterize such possibilities in terms of tariff moments.
2.4. The marginal cost of funds
When we turn to consider choices between different forms of taxa-
tion, it is useful to express our results in terms of the marginal cost of
funds (MCF) of different instruments. Consider the cost to the govern-
ment of supporting the representative agent's real income uwith a hy-
pothetical subsidy dswhen thewage tax τ changes to raise revenue R by
one dollar.
From the private-sector budget constraint (2), the hypothetical
compensating subsidy is ds= Eτdτ; while from the public-sector budget
constraint (3), the required change in the wage tax is dτ ¼ 1Rτ dR. Com-
bining these gives dsdR ¼ EτRτ which we deﬁne as μ
τ, the marginal cost of
raising a dollar of public funds using the wage tax τ. Similar operations
deﬁne themarginal cost of funds for any other policy instrument such as
πi. That is, raise a marginal dollar of public funds by increasing the tariff
on a single good ti, implicitly requiring a tax change 1Rπi
, with compensat-
ing hypothetical subsidy ds to the representative agent of μiπ. The out-
come is a marginal cost of funds for that tariff instrument equal to
Eπi
Rπi
.
What is the likely magnitude of the marginal cost of funds? In the
case of the wage tax, we assume that μτ is positive, since otherwise
the problem of how to cut tariffs without reducing revenue is trivial;
the numerator Eτ is the tax base, while the denominator Rτ is positive
provided the economy lies below the maximum of the Laffer Curve.
From Eq. (3), the full expression for Rτ is:
Rτ ¼ Eτ þ t0Eπτ þ τEττ : ð9Þ
Recalling that E is concave in τ, the direct substitution effect of a
wage tax on labor supply Eττ tends to reduce Rτ below Eτ, and so encour-
ages a value for the social cost of funds greater than one. This could be
offset by the cross effect: if leisure is a complement for imports, so Eπτ
is positive, a rise in the wage tax τ increases tariff revenue, encouraging
a value for the social cost of funds less than one. However, values greater
than one are typically found in applied studies and must be considered
the norm. Similar considerations,mutatis mutandis, apply to themagni-
tude of the marginal cost of funds of any other tax instrument.
2.5. Tariff changes compensated by wage tax changes
Armed with the concept of the marginal cost of funds, we can now
consider our second approach to tariff reform. This ensures revenue
neutrality by adjusting the wage tax to compensate for any reduction
in revenue arising from tariff changes. Thus we analyze reforms of
tariffs, i.e., changes in prices π, compensated by changes in the wage
tax τ that keep government revenue at its initial level R0. Differentiating
the private-sector budget constraint (2), the change in utility now
depends, unlike Eq. (5), on the change in the wage tax as well as on
changes in tariffs:
Eudu ¼ −E0πdt−Eτdτ: ð10Þ
Similarly, unlike Eq. (6), the change in the wage tax is determined
implicitly by the requirement that the government budget constraint
(3) must bind:
R0πdt þ Rτdτ þ Rudu ¼ dR0: ð11ÞEliminating the endogenous change in the wage tax, dτ, from
Eqs. (10) and (11) gives the expression for welfare change in this case:
1−μτRIð ÞEudu ¼ −μτdR0− E0π−μτR0π
 
dt ð12Þ
where μτ = Eτ/Rτ is the marginal cost of funds raised by the wage tax.
Although we will hold revenue ﬁxed, it is insightful to include the
change in the revenue requirement R0 in Eq. (12), since it allows us to
interpret the coefﬁcient of the welfare change on the left-hand side.
Consider the effect of a hypothetical transfer to the government which
reduces the revenue requirement R0 by one unit. The impact effect of
this on welfare is equal to the marginal cost of funds μτ. In an economy
with tariff and wage tax distortions this impact effect has multiplier re-
percussions, which are measured by the inverse of the coefﬁcient of
Eudu. This shows that the term 1 − μτRI is the inverse of the shadow
price of foreign exchange modiﬁed for the endogeneity of the wage
tax. Moreover, as with the corresponding term in Section 2.3, we are
justiﬁed in assuming that it is positive: a negative value would imply
that a gift to the economy, which relaxes the revenue requirement R0,
would lower real income.6
With income effects taken care of, we are free to concentrate on the
substitution effects of the tariff change, summarized by the coefﬁcient of
dt in Eq. (12). (We can also ignore the change in the revenue require-
ment, so we set dR0 equal to zero from now on.) Unfortunately, while
this lends itself to useful intuitive interpretations, it does not lead to eas-
ily operational rules for tariff reform. A ﬁrst approach is to consider
Eq. (12) on a commodity-by-commodity basis. Factoring out the scalar
elements of Eπ, and using μπi ≡Eπi=Rπi , Eq. (12), becomes:
1−μτRIð ÞEudu ¼ −
X
i
1−μτ=μπi
 
Eπi dti: ð13Þ
The intuitive implication of Eq. (13) is that reducing tariffs on all
goods for which μiπ N μτ and increasing tariffs on all goods for which
the inequality is reversed will produce a surplus. This in turn causes
an increase in real income, provided the shadow price of foreign ex-
change is positive.
An alternative approach to Eq. (12) is to write the term Rπ′ in full,
using Eq. (7) and the deﬁnition of the marginal cost of funds from
Eq. (9):
1−μτRIð ÞEudu ¼ μτ−1ð ÞE0π þ μτ t0Eππ þ τEτπð Þ
 
dπ: ð14Þ
This provides an insightful contrast with the usual expression for
welfare change in the theory of piecemeal tariff reform when lump-
sum taxes are available (see Eq. (34) in Appendix A), and it reduces to
it when labor supply is ﬁxed so a wage tax is effectively lump-sum
(μτ = 1 and Eτπ = 0). However, saying more about the tariff reform
problem using Eq. (14) as it stands is challenging. To make progress
with this problem, we turn in the next section to extend the method
of tariff moments developed in Anderson and Neary (2007) to the
present context.
3. Tariff moments
3.1. Summary statistics for the structure of tariffs
The key intermediate step in the analysis of trade reform is a decom-
position of the effect of tariff changes into their effect on various mo-
ments of the distribution of tariffs. Anderson and Neary (2007)
examine welfare-improving directions of tariff reform in the case
where revenue considerations are unimportant, so μτ = 1. Here we
Table 1
Notation.
Name Symbol Explanation
Government revenue function R (π− π*)′Eπ + τEτ− s
Substitution effects matrix Eππ Negative deﬁnite
Substitution weights matrix S πEπππ
π0Eπππ (positive deﬁnite)
Generalized mean tariff T ι′ST
Trade-weighted average tariff Ta E0π t
E0ππ
Cross-weighted average tariff T θ Eτπ t
Eτππ
Own elasticity η − π
0Eπππ
E0ππ
Cross elasticity θ Eτππ
Eτ
Employment elasticity ω − d log Eτd log ðwþτÞ
Wage-Tax revenue relative to value of imports λτ τEτ
E0ππ
MCF for wage tax μτ Eτ
Rτ
¼ ð1−Twω þ TθθÞ−1
MCF for scalar T reform μT E0π π
R0ππ
¼ ð1−ηT þ λτθÞ−1
8 Anderson and Neary (2007) show that T is positive if all tariff rates are equal or if all
goods subject to tariffs are general-equilibrium substitutes for the numéraire (which, with
variable labor supply, must be extended to general-equilibrium substitutes for the com-
posite commoditymade upof the numéraire and leisure).With a zerowage tax, a negative
value of T implies that μT, the marginal cost of funds for the group of tariff-ridden goods,
deﬁned in Eq. (24) below, is less than one. This means that welfare increases with a rise
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problem. Table 1 summarizes the notation.
Webegin by deﬁning “tariff factors,” tariffsmeasured as a proportion
of domestic prices:Ti≡
ti
πi
¼ πi−πiπi . These can bewritten inmatrix form as:
T ¼ π−1ðπ−πÞ, where π denotes a diagonal matrix formed from the
vector π. The analog for the wage tax is Tw≡ τwþτ. Following Anderson
and Neary (2007), we deﬁne the generalized mean tariff T and the gen-
eralized variance of tariffs V as a weighted average and variance respec-
tively of the tariff factors T:
T≡ι0ST ¼ π
0Eππt
π0Eπππ
; V≡ T−ιT
 0
S T−ιT
 
: ð15Þ
The weights are normalized elements of the substitution ef-
fects matrix Eππ: the positive deﬁnite weighting matrix S is de-
ﬁned by S≡−s−1πEπππ , where s≡−π0EπππN0 is the normalization
coefﬁcient for the substitution effects matrix, and ι is a vector of ones.
The normalization implies that ι′Sι= 1. The focus in the present paper
on the revenue constraint and endogenous labor supply requires that
we deﬁne two further average tariffs: the trade-weighted average tariff
and the cross-weighted average tariff, where the weights in the latter
are the cross-responses between leisure and each good:
Ta≡
E0πt
E0ππ
; Tθ≡
Eτπt
Eτππ
: ð16Þ
As for changes in trade policy, we deﬁne the changes in tariff
moments as Laspeyres-type approximations, using initial trade shares
and responses as weights:
dT≡ι0SdT; dV≡2T 0SdT−2TdT; dTa≡
E0ππdT
E0ππ
; dTθ≡
Eτπdπ
Eτππ
; ð17Þ
where dT≡π−1dt ¼ π−1dπ.
Except for the trade-weighted average tariff Ta, these generalized
moments and their changes are complicated functions of consumer
and producer behavior. Nonetheless, they summarize the implications
of the full matrices of aggregate demand and supply responses in an in-
tuitive and parsimonious way. In this respect, they are analogous to the
shadow price of foreign exchange introduced by Hatta (1977): it allows
all income effects to be summarized in terms of a single convenient ag-
gregate statistic, whereas earlier work typically made strong assump-
tions about income effects on a commodity-by-commodity basis, such
as requiring all goods to be normal.7 In the same way, the generalized7 Foster and Sonnenschein (1970) assumed that all goods were normal, which we now
know is far stronger than needed to obtain results about piecemeal policy reform. Bruno
(1972) seems tohavebeen theﬁrst to appreciate that income effects could be summarized
in a single parameter.tariff moments provide a set of sufﬁcient statistics for the substitution
effects in the economy. Aswewill show, analytic expressions in changes
in generalized means and variances help formulate linear tariff change
rules that guarantee welfare improvement even in the absence of de-
tailed information about substitution effects.
Notice that whereas the trade-weighted average tariff Ta is positive
so long as imports are not heavily subsidized, the generalizedmean tar-
iff need not necessarily be positive even with all positive tariffs. Being
able to assume a positive generalized mean turns out to be important
for our approach to the assessment of the welfare implications of tariff
changes when information is limited. Fortunately, a negative general-
ized mean is an unlikely perverse case.8 In the remainder of this paper
we assume that the generalized mean tariff is positive.
3.2. Tariff moments with general equilibrium separability
An important special case of preferences and technology provides a
very illuminating and convenient illustration of the generalized mo-
ments and their relationship to the observable trade-weighted average
tariff. Suppose that the group of goodswith price vector π enters prefer-
ences and technology separably:9
Deﬁnition 1. The trade expenditure function is implicitly separable in
tariffed goods and leisure when:
E π; τ;uð Þ ¼ F ϕ π;uð Þ; τ;u½ ; ð18Þ
where the function ϕ(π, u) is concave and homogeneous of degree one
in π.
Separability is a very common assumption in applied work with
both econometric and simulation modeling. Appendix B shows that all
our present argument can be applied to any separable group while
more general substitution possibilities continue to govern relationships
between groups. The payoff to assuming separability is that it implies
that both generalized average tariffs equal the observable trade-
weighted average tariff:
Proposition 1. Under separability as in Eq. (18), both the generalized
mean tariff and the cross-weighted average tariff are equal to the trade-
weighted average tariff: T ¼ Tθ ¼ Ta.
Proof. In the separable case, linear homogeneity of ϕ implies that
π′ϕπ = ϕ and π′ϕππ = 0. Hence, differentiating Eq. (18) twice with re-
spect to π, we have: Eπ = Fϕϕπ and Eππ = Fϕϕππ + Fϕϕϕπϕπ′ = Fϕϕϕϕπ′.
It follows that the generalized mean tariff from Eq. (15) becomes:
T ¼ π
0Eππt
π0Eπππ
¼ Fϕϕϕϕ
0
πt
Fϕϕϕϕ0ππ
¼ ϕ
0
πt
ϕ0ππ
¼ Ta: ð19Þ
Similarly, differentiating Eq. (18) twicewith respect to τ, gives: Eτ=
Fτ and Eτπ = Fτϕϕπ′. Hence the cross-weighted average tariff from
Eq. (16) becomes:
Tθ ¼ Eτπt
Eτππ
¼ Fτϕϕ
0
πt
Fτϕϕ0ππ
¼ ϕ
0
πt
ϕ0ππ
¼ Ta: ð20Þ
□in the tariff because marginal deadweight loss is actually negative. Replacing lump-sum
taxes with a uniform absolute rise in tariffs would be welfare-increasing in such a case.
If exports or imports are heavily subsidized, the perverse case becomes more likely, but
this perversity is also likely to show up in a negative value for Ta.
9 See Anderson and Neary (1992) for further discussion.
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Neary (2007), who showed that T equals Ta in a special case where
tariffed imports are ﬁnal goods imperfectly substitutable with domestic
production, and preferences are CES. Separability is a considerably
weaker sufﬁcient condition.10
4. Tariff changes only
With tariff reform restricted to tariff changes only, the task is to ﬁnd
directions of improvement that raise welfare and/or revenue without
lowering either one. We reexpress the differentials of the private and
government budget constraints (5) and (6) in terms of the generalized
moments of the tariff structure:11
Eudu
Eππ
¼ −dTa ð21Þ
dR
E0ππ
¼ 1−RIð ÞdTa−η 12 dV þ TdT
 
þ λτθdTθ: ð22Þ
Here we introduce two new elasticities, which summarize the ef-
fects of a uniform change in goods prices: η≡− π
0Eπππ
E0ππ
¼ sE0ππ is the own-
elasticity of the π group with respect to an equiproportionate change
in π; while θ≡ EτππEτ is the cross-elasticity of employment with respect to
an equiproportionate change in π. We also use λτ≡ τEτE0ππ to denote wage-
tax revenue relative to the value of imports.
Eqs. (21) and (22) show how the informational requirements for
tariff reformwith an arbitrary number of goods subject to tariffs are re-
duced to only six parameters (not counting the easily observable Ta and
λτ): amajor economyof information relative to the fullmatrices needed
to interpret and calibrate Eqs. (5) and (6). Eq. (21) implies that the
change in money metric utility as a percent of trade expenditure is
equal to minus the change in the trade-weighted average tariff.
Eq. (22) reveals that revenue must fall with a fall in Ta, unless compen-
sated by changes in the other tariffmoments.12What type of tariff struc-
ture changes can induce both welfare and revenue to rise?
Reductions in the generalized variance must always increase reve-
nue, all else equal. Mean-preserving reductions in dispersion are thus
attractive if it is feasible to preserve all three means ðTa; T ; TθÞ. When
the group of tariff-ridden goods being reformed enters preferences or
technology separably, the three ﬁrst moments are all equal, from
Proposition 1. This gives our ﬁrst result for tariff reform:
Proposition 2. Under separability as in Eq. (18), cuts in tariff dispersion
which leave the trade-weighted average tariff unchanged raise revenue
while not harming welfare.
Consider next reductions in average tariffs. Anderson and Neary
(2007) show that a uniform absolute cut in tariff rates, dT=− ιdα, is
attractive because it raises both welfare and market access (the value
of imports at world prices).13 Unfortunately, it ordinarily must reduce
revenue. To see this, note that such a reform leaves dispersion un-
changed (dV = 0) and reduces all three average tariffs by the same10 As shown in Anderson and Neary (2007), the CES case also yields a simple observable
expression for the generalized variance of tariffs. No such simpliﬁcation is possible for the
much wider class of weakly separable preferences or technology, but none is needed for
our purposes.
11 To derive Eq. (22) fromEq. (6), we use: t0Eππdπ ¼ T 0πEπππdT ¼ −sT 0SdT ¼ −sð12 dV þ
TdTÞ ¼ −ηð12 dV þ TdTÞE0ππ.
12 In contrast, Anderson andNeary (2007) show that welfare and “market access” (trade
volume) are moved in the same direction by changes in T but in opposite directions by
changes in variance V.
13 Such a uniform absolute cut in the tariff rates Ti implies that tariffs are reduced in pro-
portion to domestic prices: dtiπi is the same for all i. This preserves domestic relative prices,
unlike the more familiar uniform radial reduction in tariffs, which implies that tariffs are
reduced in proportion to their initial values:dtiti is the same for all i. See Anderson andNeary
(2007), especially Table 1 and Fig. 2, for further details.proportion: dTa ¼ dT ¼ dTθ ¼ −dα . These results do not depend on
separability; they arise because a uniform absolute cut in tariff rates Ti
brings about a uniform proportional reduction in domestic prices,
dπ=− πdα, so imported goods constitute a Hicksian composite com-
modity. As a result, from Eq. (22), revenue changes by:
dR
E0ππ
¼ − 1−RI−ηT þ λτθ
 
dα ¼ − 1
μT
−RI
 	
dα: ð23Þ
Here we use μT to denote the marginal cost of funds for the group of
tariff-ridden goods, which, by the composite commodity theorem, can
be treated as if it were a single good when prices move
equiproportionately:
μT≡
E0ππ
R0ππ
¼ 1−ηT þ θλτ −1: ð24Þ
As discussed in Section 2.4, there is a presumption that themarginal
cost of funds is greater than one for each individual good, so it must be
considered highly unlikely that this marginal cost of funds of a compos-
ite group could be less then one. We also expect RI, the effect of a unit
gift of foreign exchange on government revenue, to lie between zero
and one, as discussed in Section 2.3. Given this, the sign of the right-
hand side of Eq. (23) is ambiguous, although there is a presumption
that the direct price effect 1/μT outweighs the income effect RI: uniform
absolute reductions ordinarily imply that revenue falls: 14
Proposition 3. Uniform absolute reductions in T raise both welfare and
market access, but raise revenue if and only if the inverse of the marginal
cost of funds for all tariff-ridden goods, μT, is less than the income respon-
siveness of revenue, RI.
Summarizing this section, given that very large dispersion is com-
mon in tariff structures, even in countries that raise a substantial portion
of government revenue from tariffs, Proposition 2 implies considerable
scope for efﬁciency improvement from dispersion cuts. On the other
hand, Proposition 3 implies that absolute tariff cuts with constant dis-
persion decrease revenue, which creates a presumption against average
tariff reductions as part of a reform package when tariff revenue is im-
portant (i.e., when tariffs are the only instrument).
5. Tariff reform with compensating wage tax changes
5.1. Tariff reform rules in terms of generalized moments
Tariff reform advice has more scope for efﬁciency gains when the
wage tax τ can be changed so as to hold revenue constant. As we saw
in Section 2.5, the general expression for welfare change given by
Eq. (14) is not so informative in this case. However, reexpressing it in
terms of tariff moments gives more insight:
1−μτRI
E0ππ
Eudu ¼ μτ−1ð ÞdTa−μτη 12 dV þ TdT
 
þ μτλτθdTθ: ð25Þ
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of Eq. (25) is increasing in the
trade-weighted average tariff provided that μτ N 1. This term gives the
revenue effect of the tariff change at constant quantities demanded,
without substitution effects. The second term gives the effect of tariff
changes acting throughwithin-group substitution effects, all multiplied
by the own-price elasticity of the composite imported good, η. It is de-
creasing in the generalized variance and, provided T N0, in the general-
ized mean. The third term gives the cross effect on revenue due to the14 In the neighborhood of zero taxation, μT= 1 and RI =0, implying that quite substan-
tial levels of tariffs and taxes are necessary for revenue to rise.
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elasticity between leisure and goods.
What combinations of assumed information and rules for tariff
changes are likely to improve welfare in this case? The general expres-
sion (25) provides useful clues. First, variance reduction is useful, all else
equal. Second, the uniform absolute reduction reform is once again an
important benchmark. Proposition 3 shows that it usually reduces
revenue. Can a wage-tax increase compensate and still permit a real in-
come gain? In this case Eq. (25) reduces to:
1−μτRI
E0ππ
Eudu
dα
¼ 1− μ
τ
μT
: ð26Þ
As discussed in the last section, μT, the composite marginal cost of
funds of the group of tariff-ridden goods, is presumptively positive: re-
call Eq. (24). What of μτ, the marginal cost of funds of the employment
tax? Using Eq. (9), we can write it in terms of generalized moments as:
μτ≡
Eτ
Rτ
¼ 1−ωTw þ θTθ
 −1
; ð27Þ
where ω≡− d logEτd logðwþτÞ is the general-equilibrium elasticity of employ-
ment with respect to the tax τ.15 General results on the sign of 1− μ
τ
μT
are not possible and empirical evidence is sparse.16 However, it seems
plausible that μ
τ
μT b1, i.e., that a tariff is less efﬁcient than the alternative
distortionary tax. For example, this is the ﬁnding of Erbil (2004) in a
simulation exercise comparing the marginal cost of funds of trade
taxes with consumption taxes for a number of countries. From
Eq. (26), this is all we need to assume to be conﬁdent that combining re-
ductions in dispersion with scalar cuts in tariffs offers room for welfare-
and revenue-improving reforms that are robust to our very substantial
uncertainty about economic structure.
For more general results that can cover more of the complexity of
actual tariff changes, it is very helpful to consider a more general
radial tariff reform rule introduced by Anderson and Neary (2007),
dT =− (T− βι)dα. This implies an equiproportionate change in the
gap between all tariff rates and an arbitrary uniform tariff rate, denoted
byβ. A rise inα always lowers variance andwill lower any average tariff
provided it is greater than β.17 This general linear path is a combination
of uniform absolute and uniformproportional changes in tariffs. It is also
a convex combination of uniform absolute tariff changes and trade-
weighted mean-preserving variance changes.18 Along the linear path:
1−μτRI
E0ππ
Eudu
dα
¼ 1−μτð Þ Ta−β þ μτηV
þ μτ ηT T−β −λτθ Tθ−β h i: ð28Þ
Then using μT N 1 (soηT Nλτθ) and additionally supposing that T ≥Tθ ≥
β, the expression in square bracketsmust be positive. In particular, setting15 In general equilibrium, the wage tax affects employment both directly and by chang-
ing the wage. Applying the implicit function theorem to the labor-market clearing condi-
tion ew(π,w, u) = gw(π,w+ τ, v) yields dw/dτ= gww/(eww− gww). A rise in thewage tax
alters employment Eτ = − gw by dEτ/dτ = − gww(1 + dw/dτ). Then − d ln Eτ/d ln
(w+ τ) = (w + τ)(gwweww)/[gw(eww − gww)] N 0 by the concavity of e, convexity of g,
and gw =− Eτ b 0.
16 An important benchmark is optimality, the solution to the Ramsey problem. This re-
quires that the marginal cost of funds be equal for all π, and equal to the marginal cost
of funds for the alternative source of tax revenue, in this case the wage tax.
17 dTa =− (Ta− β)dα, and similarly for dT and dTθ; while dV=−2Vdα.
18 (T−βι)dα=[ω(T− Taι)− (1−ω)δι]dγwheredγ= dα/ω andβ= Ta+ δ(1−ω)/ω
for 1 ≥ ω ≥ 0. The scalar δ can be positive or negative.the tariff change rule such that β= Ta, welfare rises with αwhenever T ≥
T θ ≥T a ¼ β. Summarizing:
Proposition 4. Welfare improves with:
(i) Trade-weighted mean-preserving reductions in tariff variance,
when T ≥Tθ ≥Ta and μT N 1;
(ii) Uniform absolute tariff reductions, when 1 b μτ b μT;
(iii) Convex combinations of uniform absolute tariff cuts and trade-
weighted mean-preserving dispersion cuts, β ≤ Ta, under the condi-
tions of (i) and (ii).
Proof. (i) and (ii) have already been proved. To prove (iii), rearrange
the right-hand side of Eq. (28) and divide by Ta− β N 0 to obtain:
Eudu
dα
∝1−μτ 1−ηT
T−β
Ta−β
þ θTw T
θ−β
Ta−β
" #
þ μτη V
Ta−β
  : ð29Þ
The square bracket term is smaller than the inverse of μT under the
conditions of (i), and hence the entire expression is positive under the
condition of (ii). □
The conditionT ≥T θ≥T a is problematic, depending on two unobserv-
able average tariffs. However, it is guaranteed if separability holds, from
Proposition 1. It follows that Proposition 4 holds with separability and
1 b μτ b μT. In the future, more insight into the behavior of the unobserv-
ables will be generated by examining simulations with a variety of
models and data for different countries.
The separable case shows that mere substitutability is not important
in ranking T and Tθ relative to Ta. Substitution effects within classes of
tariff-ridden goods are irrelevant, complementarities are admissible
alongwith highly asymmetric substitution effects. For example, it is nat-
ural to think of an aggregate like clothing as a goods class, entering pref-
erences separably but having complex substitution effects within class:
shirts and trousers may be complements while silk and chambray
shirts may be substitutes. What does matter for the ranking is that
nonseparability admits varying substitution effects between tariff-
ridden goods and the numeraire. Using the standard algebra of covari-
ance, T−Ta ¼ Covðω; TÞ−Covðωa; TÞ, where the covariance uses arith-
metic (equal) weights. The generalized weights ω differ from the
trade share weights ωa only if the goods are non-separable and TbTa
with non-separability if numeraire substitution effect shares ω are
more sensitive to high tariffs than are trade shares ωa.
Proposition 4 can readily be extended to many classes of separable
tariff-ridden goods. Let Tka denote the trade-weighted average tariff
in separable goods class k, while Ta continues to denote the overall
trade-weighted average tariff and T continues to denote the overall
generalized mean tariff.
Proposition 5. Welfare improves with:
1. Trade-weighted mean-preserving dispersion cuts within separable
goods classes;
2. Any convex combination of such dispersion cuts and a uniform absolute
tariff change across as well as within classes that decreases tariffs when
they are over-utilized or increases them when they are under-utilized.
Proposition 5 is proved in the Appendix. The key element is that,
from Proposition 1, the condition of Proposition 4 is met under separa-
bility. The proposition is quite useful because separability is a ubiquitous
assumption in applied work. Faced with some ten thousand tariff lines,
aggregation is inevitable for any econometric or simulation work. The
proposition guarantees that trade-weighted average preserving disper-
sion cuts within classes are welfare-improvingwithout detailed knowl-
edge of substitution effects (either parameter values or speciﬁcation)
within goods classes. National tariff schedules are full of dispersion in
detailed product classes, so there is a lot of room in practice for
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weightedmean-preserving tariff dispersion cut improveswelfare strict-
ly by raising government revenue; trade expenditure remains constant
under this reform.
Note ﬁnally that, from Eqs. (24) and (27), the separable case where
T ¼ Tθ ¼ Ta yields directly useful expressions for μT and μτ that can be
used to calculate the relative under- or over-utilization of tariffs:
μT ¼ 1−ηTa þ θλτ −1; μτ ¼ 1−ωTw þ θTa −1: ð30Þ
Ta, λτ and Tw are observable, so it is relatively easy to test the sensi-
tivity of μ
τ
μT to alternative values of the elasticities η, θ and ω which are
not known with certainty.
5.2. The CES special case
Clearly the conditions derived so far are only sufﬁcient, and addi-
tional restrictions on either the structure of the economy or the type
of trade reform permitted would allow some strengthening of them.
Specialization to the CES case with zero cross-effects between goods
and leisure (θ=0) is insightful since in this simple but canonical setting
themarginal cost of funds for each individual tariff can be derived inde-
pendently of all others:19
μπi ¼ 1−ηTa−σ Ti−Ta
  −1
: ð31Þ
The CES expression (31) for the marginal cost of funds reveals that
the focus of Propositions 4 and 5 on convex combinations of mean-
preserving tariff cuts and dispersion-preserving mean cuts does indeed
capture all the relevant characteristics of welfare-improving revenue
tariff reformwhich can be guaranteedwithout full knowledge of substi-
tution effects. If exact values of η and σ are assumed to be known, it is of
course possible to improvewelfarewith tariff reforms outside the cones
based on Eq. (31).20 As substitution possibilities range more widely be-
yond the CES, more welfare-improving revenue tariff reforms can be
found which are not within the cones of Propositions 2, 3, and 4. But
again, showing that these reforms raisewelfare depends on information
that this paper assumes, realistically, that the analyst is unlikely ever to
have with any certainty.
Note that the CES expression sheds light on the esoteric possibility
that some tariffs may actually have a marginal cost of funds less than
one. From Eq. (31), the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for μ iπ b 1 is
(1− η/σ)Ta N Ti. The sufﬁcient condition requires either that η/σ b 1,
substitution elasticities within the separable group exceed substitution
elasticities between that group and all other goods, or that good i is sub-
ject to an import subsidy, so Ti b 0. Normally neither conditionwould be
met.
5.3. The desirability of dispersion cuts
Further analysis of the desirability of trade-weighted mean-
preserving dispersion cuts is useful, since it seems to argue for uniformi-
ty in contrast to the intuition of the Ramsey principle. The sufﬁciency
condition T ≥Ta appears to be puzzlingly powerful.
Returning to Fig. 1, the ray OR through the Ramsey optimal tariff
point R divides the domestic price space into half spaces. Starting at
point R, consider a mean-tariff-preserving line (not drawn) to the uni-
form tariff ray OF. For points on this line between the uniform tariff19 In the CES case, ϕi j ¼ σð−δi j þwjÞwi ϕπiπ j .
20 In the CES case the half space of welfare-improving reforms is deﬁned by tariffs such
that {ι− [μτ(1− ηTa)ι− μτσ(T− Taι)]}′dπ b 0. The condition that μτ/μT N 1 is equivalent
to μτ(1− ηTa) b 1.Mean-preserving dispersion cuts reduce government costs, dispersion-
preservingmean cuts (uniform absolute cuts) reduce government costs, convex combina-
tions of these also reduce costs. But many other cuts lie in the half space below the
constraint.ray OF and the optimal tariff ray OR, trade-weighted mean-preserving
dispersion increases are welfare-improving. For points in the space
below ray OR, dispersion increases are welfare-decreasing. If the cone
FOR is small, the World Bank intuition about the desirability of disper-
sion reduction holds for most of the tariff space.
Next, consider the initial tariffs A, lying on an iso-utility locus as
shown. Recall that the line labeled dTa = 0 gives the mean-preserving
tariff change path. As drawn, decreases in dispersion raise welfare, im-
plying T NTa. A line tangent to the iso-utility locus at point A represents
the situation where V þ TðT−TaÞ ¼ 0: If the locus dTa = 0 is steeper
than the tangent line toGA atA, a reduction in dispersion lowerswelfare.
With separability, T ¼ Ta , hence welfare rises for mean-preserving
changes in dispersion. This implies that the Ramsey-optimal tariff is uni-
form in the separable case (Guesnerie, 1995); i.e., point R lies on OF.
Extending separability tomultiple classes as in Proposition 5, uniformity
of tariffs within classes is optimal. This benchmark case suggests that
optimal departures from uniformity may be small for a fairly wide
class of reasonable general equilibrium structures.
The desirability of dispersion cuts becomes less surprising when we
recall that the linear reform rule restricts outcomes relative to the starting
point. The full optimumR is not attainable. The optimal tariff structure im-
plied by the linear reform rule dT= (T− βι)dα is, for mean-preserving
dispersion changes β= Ta, consistent with V ¼ −TðT−TaÞ. Fig. 2 illus-
trates a case where the mean-preserving dispersion cut line AU is associ-
ated with increases in welfare relative to uA for each point on the path to
the uniform tariff ray OF. Nevertheless, the full optimal tariff point R is
non-uniform and yields still higher welfare.21 Moreover, there is a best
tariff subject to the linear rule and the initial condition TA which lies
somewhere on the path from A to U, and this tariff is non-uniform unless
it lies atU.TbTa is necessary for amovement from A toU not to raise wel-
fare relative to uA for each point on the path.
6. Many households
The preceding expressions extend with appropriate modiﬁcation to
the case of many households. The government budget constraint con-
tinues to hold using E for the aggregate trade expenditure function
and its derivatives, while Eh denotes the individual household h trade
expenditure function.
To economize on notation, we express the change in welfare in
terms of the hypothetical subsidy that must be made to each agent h
to maintain their real income. By deﬁnition ds=∑hdsh, the aggregate
subsidy is the sum of subsidies needed to maintain each agent's real in-
come. The budget constraint for agent (household) h yields:
dsh ¼ Ehπ  πdTa;h þ Ehτ wþ τð ÞdTw; ð32Þ
where Ta,h is the trade-weighted average tariff using the trade weights
of agent h. dTw is endogenously generated from the government reve-
nue constraint to compensate for the exogenous tariff changes. Solving
that aggregate constraint as before, substituting into the equation above
and rearranging yields:
dsh ¼ Ehπ  πdTa;h−
Ehτ
Eτ
Eπ  π
 !
μτdTa−
Ehτ
Eτ
Eπ  π
 !
μτ ηdV=2þ TdT−TwθdTθ
h i
:
ð33Þ
Summing over households h, theﬁrst two terms cancel out. The con-
dition that reform be beneﬁcial in the aggregate (representative agent)
case is that the third term be negative. Propositions 4 and 5 apply.
The potential for individual loss is conﬁned to the deviation due to
the balance of the ﬁrst two terms. Agents can differ in their tastes for21 The Ramsey-optimal tariff vector is given by T0 ¼ μτ−1μτ s S−1πEπ, where all variables are
evaluated at the Ramsey optimum.
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U
Fig. 2.Welfare-improving dispersion cuts. On path AU, trade-weighted-mean-preserving
tariff cuts raise welfare font = small. On path AO, uniform absolute tariff cuts ﬁrst raise
welfare, then lower it.
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attached to the average tariff differentials, and they can differ in their
consumption patterns within the tariffed goods bundle when faced
with the same price vectors. The latter results in dTa,h ≠ dTa while the
former results in Eπh ⋅ π ≠ (Eτh/Eτ)Eπ ⋅ π.
What minimal information is needed to specify welfare-improving
rules for each household (Pareto superior rules)? Tariffs are widely lev-
ied on intermediate goods. In this case there is no household-speciﬁc
weighting, Tai = Ta, so dispersion cuts are Pareto-superior. As for ﬁnal
goods, assume that imported goods in a separable goods class have no
domestic perfect substitute, and that household expenditure patterns
Eπ
h are observable. The former is a widely used empirical assumption be-
cause the perfect substitutes assumption yields implications wildly at
variance with the trade data. The observability of household expendi-
ture patterns is a more problematic assumption but it is satisﬁed for a
number of countries.
Under these assumptions, the βh parameters can be set equal to
the household level trade-weighted average tariff Ta,h to implement
the mean preserving dispersion cut: dTh = (T− Ta,h)dα. The mecha-
nism is a uniform deviation from the common tariff cut rule for each
household: dTh− dT= (Ta,h− Ta)ιdα. All tariffs are changed accord-
ing to dT = (T − Taι)dα. Implementation of the household speciﬁc
deviations could presumably take place at the retail level (as with
food stamps or senior citizen discounts), supplemented by some
governmental identiﬁcation system. Doing so, for example, all cloth-
ing tariffs change according to the common rule, then each house-
hold receives or pays its household speciﬁc deviation (Ta,h − Ta)dα.
Alternatively, the implementation could be done through income
tax credits. To avoid shirking, the common rule could be set around
the highest Ta,h, so that all households with lower average tariffs re-
ceive a rebate.
In this scheme of tariffs, the real income of each household is
maintained, the individual variation of βh is revenue neutral since
∑h(Ta,h − Ta)π′Eπh = 0, and the government revenue will rise due
to the revenue-increasing cut in dispersion. Thus dispersion cuts
are a Pareto-superior reform. As for uniform absolute cuts in tariffs,
the requirement of Propositions 2 and 3 that ‘tariffs are over
(under) utilized’ becomes extremely stringent because it requires
that the marginal cost of funds of the alternative revenue source be
less (more) than each individual agent's marginal cost of funds of tar-
iffs. This is seldom likely to appear plausible to analysts evaluating
potential reforms.
The implication is that the Pareto-superiority of dispersion cuts
holds in the many household case under the separability assumption,
understanding that trade-weighted average tariffs must be calculated
and applied at the household level. The separability assumption isplausible for some goods classes and not for others. Still, this discussion
suggests the surprisingly wide desirability of dispersion cuts.
7. Conclusion
This paper has derived rules for welfare-improving trade reform that
permit conﬁdent policy advice despite the (assumed partial) ignorance
of analysts about the true structure of the economy. Dispersion-
reducing trade reform is surprisingly widely beneﬁcial: whenever house-
holds have implicitly separable preferences with respect to the same par-
titions of goods, dispersion of tariffs within separable groups is inefﬁcient.
Cuts in average tariffs are efﬁcientwhen themarginal cost of funds of such
tariffs is greater than the marginal cost of funds from alternative revenue
sources. Convex combinations of uniform absolute cuts and mean-
preserving dispersion cuts are beneﬁcial under these conditions. Over
and above these speciﬁc results, we have shown the value of reexpressing
complex results for multi-dimensional policy reform in terms of a small
number of summary statistics. This approach should prove useful both
in guiding empirical work and in allowing an intuitive focus on the key
parameters that matter for policy evaluation.
Appendix A. Piecemeal policy reform with lump-sum transfers
We assume in the body of the paper that the government cannot
impose lump-sum taxes or grant lump-sum subsidies. By contrast, the
standard theory of piecemeal trade policy reform assumes that lump-
sum transfers are available. In that case, as noted in Section 2.1, the
private-sector and government budget constraints, Eqs. (3) and (2),
can be combined to give the balance of trade constraint, Eq. (4).
Differentiating this yields:
1−RIð ÞEudu ¼ −dR0 þ t0Eππ þ τEτπ½ dt þ t0Eπτ þ τEττ½ dτ ð34Þ
where RI, the income responsiveness of revenue, is deﬁned in
Section 2.3. The coefﬁcient of the change in real income, 1− RI, is the in-
verse of the shadow price of foreign exchange discussed there. Assum-
ing it is positive, the right-hand-side terms in Eq. (34) lead to the
standard results of piecemeal tariff reform, allowing in addition for a
labor tax. In the special case where there is no labor tax (so τ =
Eπτ = 0), Eq. (34) reduces to a result which is familiar from Hatta
(1977) and subsequent work:
1−RIð ÞEudu ¼ −dR0 þ t0Eππdt: ð35Þ
Comparing this with Eq. (5) in the text shows how the welfare ef-
fects of changes in tariffs are sensitive towhether or not the government
has the power to make lump-sum transfers.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 5
The separable case gives rise to useful simpliﬁcations of the model.
Here the logic is extended to many separable classes.
Suppose that the tariff-ridden group of goods forms an implicitly
separable class in the trade expenditure function: E(π, p, π0, u) =
F[ϕ(π, u), p, π0, u], where ϕ is concave and homogeneous of degree
one in π. When imported goods form separable classes indexed by k,
such as ηk(πk), the logic of the text yields T
k ¼ Tak with the natural ex-
tension of notation. Mean-preserving dispersion reduction is desirable
within classes. When combined with overall uniform tariff change, the
tariff change policy rule is given by
dTk ¼ − Tk−βkιk
 
dα; ∀k ð36Þ
where ι is understood to be the vector of ones with dimension appropri-
ate to goods class k and βk is a scalar for goods class k. The combination of
159J.E. Anderson, J.P. Neary / Journal of International Economics 98 (2016) 150–159trade-weighted mean-preserving change with uniform absolute change
overall requires βk = Tak + β. As for overall mean tariffs, we deﬁne
Ta=∑ωkaTak, whereωak ¼
Eηk η
k
∑Eηk η
k, the tradeweights for the classes of im-
ports. The generalized mean overall tariff is deﬁned by T ¼ ∑ωkTak ,
where the generalized weights are deﬁned as in the text, but using the
price aggregators ηk as the individual prices.
Deﬁne the row vector b′≡{β1ι1,…, βKιK}. The trade-weighted average
of b is ba= Ta+ β, while the generalized average of b is b ¼ T þ β. Using
these properties to simplify the expression for welfare change
from Eq. (12) with dR0 = 0 in terms of tariff moments gives, instead of
Eq. (25):
1−μτRI
E0ππ
Eudu
dα
¼ 1−μτð Þ Ta−ba þ μτs
E0ππ
V þ T T−b
 
−Cov T; bð Þ
n o
: ð37Þ
Here, Cov(T, b) denotes the generalized covariance ðT−TÞ0Sðb−bÞ:
In the separable case, the covariance is equal to zero. Covariation
within classes is obviously equal to zero because the elements of b
within class do not vary. Between classes, the class-mean-preserving el-
ement of βk implies no change in price aggregates while the mean shift
element of βk implies a uniform shift which gives no variation. Applying
the other implications of the structure of b yields:
1−μτRI
E0ππ
Eudu
dα
¼ −β 1−μτð Þ þ μ
τsT
E0ππ
V
T
−β
 	
¼ −β 1− μ
τ
μT
 	
þ μτ 1− 1
μT
 	
V
T
:
ð38Þ
The substitutions from the ﬁrst to the second line use the fact that
s T
E0ππ
¼ 1− 1μT . Jointly sufﬁcient conditions for Eq. (38) to be positive, so
welfare is increased by the policy rule Eq. (36), are that μ
τ
μT b1 and
β b 0. This is the case of over-utilized tariffs and uniform tariff increases
combined with increases in trade-weighted mean-preserving disper-
sion. Thus we have proved Proposition 5.References
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